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ABSTRACT 
 
Many U.S. lawmakers view cap and trade as a politically superior non-tax approach to 
climate policy. However, cap and trade imposes identical economic burdens on 
households to a similarly designed carbon tax. Using the newly-released 2002 input-
output accounts we present new estimates of the distributional impact of a typical cap-
and-trade system by income, age, U.S. region and family type. In total, households would 
face an annual burden of roughly $144.8 billion per year with costs disproportionately 
borne by low-income households, those under age 25 and over 75 years, those in 
Southern states, and single parents with dependent children. Using RIMS II multipliers 
we estimate the broader economic impact of cap and trade. Depending on how the system 
is structured, cap and trade could reduce U.S. employment by 965,000 jobs, household 
earnings by $37.8 billion, and economic output by $136 billion per year or roughly 
$1,145 per household. Lawmakers weighing the costs and benefits of climate policy 
should be aware that cap and trade would impose a significant and regressive annual 
burden on U.S. households, and would not represent a “tax free” way to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions.  
                                                 
* The author is an adjunct scholar at the Tax Foundation. I would like to thank Robert Carroll and Gerald 
Prante for thoughtful criticism of earlier drafts. All remaining errors are the sole responsibility of the 
author.  
 2 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 3 
 
II. Economic Theory of Climate Policy.............................................................................. 5 
A. How Climate Policy Affects Markets ........................................................................ 5 
B. Impact on the Broader U.S. Economy........................................................................ 8 
 
III. Distributional Impact of a Cap-and-Trade System ..................................................... 10 
A. Burdens by Income Group ....................................................................................... 13 
B. Burdens by Age Group............................................................................................. 16 
C. Burdens by U.S. Region........................................................................................... 18 
D. Burdens by Type of Family ..................................................................................... 20 
E. Comparing Cap-and-Trade Burdens to Other Household Tax Burdens .................. 22 
F. Impact on Consumer Prices ...................................................................................... 23 
 
IV. Economic Impact of a Cap-and-Trade System........................................................... 25 
A. Impact on Employment, Household Earnings and Economic Output ..................... 25 
B. Impact on Equity Prices ........................................................................................... 28 
 
V. Methodology and Data Sources ................................................................................... 29 
A. Distributional Analysis ............................................................................................ 29 
B. Economic Impact Analysis....................................................................................... 35 
 
References......................................................................................................................... 36 
 3 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Climate change legislation has become a top Congressional priority in recent months. In 
June 2008 the Lieberman-Warner cap-and-trade bill (S. 2191) was brought to debate in 
the U.S. Senate, and during the recent presidential campaign both President Obama and 
Sen. McCain placed climate change at the center of their domestic policy agendas.1 With 
the inclusion of a cap-and-trade proposal in the President’s Fiscal Year 2010 budget, it is 
likely that the new administration will pursue federal climate legislation in the coming 
months.2  
 
Lawmakers face two basic options for climate policy: a federal carbon tax, or a U.S. cap-
and-trade system. Both policies have a similar goal of cutting greenhouse gas emissions. 
However, cap and trade is often viewed as more politically attractive because of 
lawmakers’ unwillingness to be associated with explicit tax increases. A cap-and-trade 
system offer lawmakers a way to curb greenhouse gas emissions through regulations 
rather than tax increases—a less visible approach that enjoys the popular perception of 
being less burdensome to households.  
 
Contrary to this perception, economic theory teaches that cap and trade and carbon taxes 
impose nearly identical economic burdens on households.3 Both policies increase 
consumer prices for carbon-intensive products and lower real household income in an 
economically equivalent way. The popular view that cap and trade offers a “tax free” way 
to address climate change is therefore based on a misconception of how the economic 
burdens of climate policy—both cap and trade and carbon taxes—will ultimately be 
borne by American households. 
 
The goal of this study is to clarify the equivalence of cap and trade and carbon taxes from 
the standpoint of household burdens and illustrate the annual cost of a typical cap-and-
trade system to U.S. households. Using an input-output model of the U.S. economy, we 
illustrate the distributional impact of a cap-and-trade system that cuts greenhouse gas 
emissions by 15 percent compared to 2006 levels by income group, age, U.S. region and 
type of family. Additionally, using RIMS II multipliers from the U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis we illustrate the likely economic impact of a U.S. cap-and-trade 
system on employment, household earnings and total economic output.  
 
                                                 
1 The complete Lieberman-Warner cap-and-trade bill is available as Senate bill 2191, “America’s Climate 
Security Act of 2007.” Available online at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:S.2191:. 
2 See Budget of the United States Government: Fiscal Year 2010, available at 
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/. 
3 See Weitzman (1974) for a review of conditions under which the theoretical equivalency of carbon taxes 
and cap and trade may not hold. For example, if there is uncertainty about the size of the economic costs of 
a strict carbon limit, a more flexible carbon tax may be preferred. By contrast, if there is uncertainty about 
the economic costs of allowing carbon emissions to exceed some limit, or uncertainty about firms’ 
elasticities with respect to carbon taxes, a cap-and-trade system may be preferred.  
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The findings suggest a federal cap-and-trade system would impose a significant annual 
burden on households, and that this burden is economically equivalent to a similarly 
designed federal carbon tax. Contrary to popular perception, cap and trade does not 
represent a less costly way to address climate change than a carbon tax from the 
standpoint of household burdens. As lawmakers weigh the costs and benefits of curbing 
greenhouse gas emissions, they should be cognizant of these costs to U.S. households—
particularly low- and middle families least able to bear them.  
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II. ECONOMIC THEORY OF CLIMATE POLICY 
 
Cap-and-trade systems are often viewed as regulations rather than taxes. However, 
economic theory shows that cap and trade imposes an identical annual burden on 
households to a similarly designed carbon tax. Regardless of which approach lawmakers 
choose, both policies impose equivalent costs from the standpoint of U.S. households.  
 
In this section we provide an overview of the economic theory of climate policy, 
illustrating the basic equivalence of cap and trade and carbon taxes on annual household 
burdens.  
A. HOW CLIMATE POLICY AFFECTS MARKETS 
The central goal of climate policy is to cut U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. Both carbon 
taxes and cap and trade achieve this by placing controls on suppliers throughout the 
economy. In the language of supply and demand, both policies shift the supply curve for 
carbon-intensive products upward, forcing up consumer prices for these products. Carbon 
taxes achieve this with a simple per-unit tax, while cap and trade achieves it with a 
regulatory quantity restriction. But from the standpoint of consumers bearing the ultimate 
burden, both policies have exactly the same impact.  
 
The easiest way to see the equivalence of carbon taxes and cap and trade is through a 
simple supply and demand diagram. In Figure 1 we illustrate the impact of both policies. 
The left panel shows a carbon tax and the right panel shows a cap-and-trade system.  
 
FIGURE 1. PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM IMPACT OF CARBON TAX AND CAP-AND-TRADE SYSTEM 
 
Source: Tax Foundation. 
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In the figure, before federal carbon policy the economy operates at the point labeled A in 
both panels. At this point, the price of carbon-intensive products is labeled P0  and the 
economy produces Q0 units of carbon-heavy products per year. This corresponds to the 
current U.S. economy without federal climate policy.  
 
Imagine Congress aims to cut carbon emissions to some lower level associated with Q1 in 
the figure. In the left-hand panel they do so with a carbon tax, which is designed to 
discourage carbon emissions indirectly by affecting prices. In the right panel they do so 
with a cap-and-trade system, which is designed to reduce emissions by directly limiting 
the quantity of carbon emitted in the economy.  
 
In the left panel, the carbon tax raises production costs for companies that produce 
carbon-intensive products by the amount of the tax per ton. This shifts the supply curve 
upward by the amount of the tax. In the figure, lawmakers impose a tax of x dollars 
which moves the supply curve upward to the line labeled S*. After the tax, the economy 
moves to the point labeled B. Prices rise to P1 as carbon tax burdens are passed on to 
consumers and carbon emissions fall to the targeted level of Q1. 
 
In the right-hand panel, lawmakers instead reduce carbon emissions with a U.S. cap-and-
trade system. Under cap and trade, lawmakers simply “cap” total carbon emissions at 
some predetermined level. In the figure, the capped quantity is the emissions target 
associated with Q1. Tradable permits or “allowances” are then distributed to companies 
with each allowance granting the right to emit one unit of carbon per year.  
 
Cap and trade operates like a quantity restriction that transforms the supply curve in the 
right panel into a vertical line labeled S* at the emissions target set by lawmakers. Under 
the cap the economy moves to the new point labeled B. Since cap and trade essentially 
rotates the supply curve to the left, it reduces output and raises prices just like a carbon 
tax. Once the cap is in place, prices for carbon-intensive products rise to P1—the exact 
level as under a similarly designed carbon tax in the left-hand panel—as cap and trade 
burdens are passed on to consumers throughout the economy.  
 
As is clear from the figure, the economic impact of carbon taxes and cap and trade are 
essentially the same. Both cut the economy’s carbon emissions to the same level and both 
raise prices for carbon-intensive products by the same amount. Regardless of the policy 
lawmakers choose, U.S. households will ultimately bear an equivalent economic burden 
from either approach to federal climate policy.4  
 
Impact on Government Revenue 
While both policies have an identical impact on households, they have dramatically 
different impacts on government revenue. Under a carbon tax government collects tax 
                                                 
4 While the supply curve in Figure 1 is presented as upward-sloping for the purposes of illustration, the 
modeling in this study is based on the assumption of a horizontal or perfectly elastic long-run supply curve 
for carbon-intensive products. See note 22 and accompanying text for a detailed explanation.   
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revenue from companies that emit carbon. In Figure 1, this revenue corresponds to the 
light-grey rectangle in the left-hand panel, which is equal to the tax rate x times the 
quantity of carbon emitted Q1. Once this tax revenue is collected the federal government 
can then spend it in a variety of ways—cutting corporate or personal income taxes, 
refunding it as a lump-sum transfer to households, or simply increasing other federal 
spending.  
 
By contrast, under a cap-and-trade system the revenue to government depends on how the 
initial allowances are distributed. If allowances are sold through an auction government 
will collect revenue from the sale of allowances. In Figure 1, this auction revenue 
corresponds to the light gray rectangle in the right panel, which is equal to the market-
determined allowance price of x times the quantity of allowances sold Q1.
5 Government 
can then dispose of this revenue just as with the tax revenue from a federal carbon tax.  
 
However, government can also freely distribute allowances to companies, or offer them 
at a discounted price. This was the “grandfathering” approach largely followed by the 
European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS) currently in place throughout 
Europe.6 Under freely distributed permits the revenue impact is more complicated. A cap-
and-trade system essentially forces large sectors of the economy to operate as a cartel, 
restricting carbon output and raising prices. As with any cartel, the cartelization of carbon 
emissions has the potential to create large economic rents for companies lucky enough to 
obtain allowances for free. For example, a company receiving free initial allowances can 
immediately resell them on the open trading market for a potentially large one-time 
profit. In this way, free allocation of allowances would create large one-time windfall 
profits for U.S. companies that receive allowances that are roughly equal in the aggregate 
to the total market value of the allowances distributed by government.  
 
Because of the various federal, state and local corporate income taxes, governments 
would recapture somewhere on the order of 40 percent of these extra profits created by 
free initial allowances.7 The remaining 60 percent would ultimately accrue to 
shareholders throughout the economy. In this way, government would receive significant 
revenue from cap and trade even if initial allowances are freely distributed. In effect, free 
distribution of initial allowances is equivalent selling initial allowance via auction and 
                                                 
5 If a carbon tax and cap and trade have the same emissions-reduction goal, the equilibrium price of 
allowances will equal the per-unit carbon tax. To see why, consider the right-hand panel of Figure 1. At the 
capped quantity of 1Q  companies holding allowances can sell output at a price of 1P  but can produce it for 
the lower price given by the height of the supply curve at 1Q . The vertical distance between the two—
labeled x in the figure—represents the pure economic profit companies can earn by holding an allowance. 
Companies will therefore bid up allowance prices to x dollars, which is also equal to the carbon tax rate that 
would achieve a similar emissions cut.  
6 See European Commission, “Questions and Answers on Emissions Trading and National Allocation Plans 
for 2008 to 2012.” Available online at www.ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/pdf/m06_452_en.pdf. 
7 The Congressional Budget Office assumes governments recapture 45 percent of economic rents from free 
allowances. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the 
combined U.S. top marginal corporate tax rate is closer to 40 percent, which is the figure used in this study.  
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then distributing the auction proceeds directly back to carbon-emitting companies in the 
form of a one-time profit. These profits would then be divided 60-40 between 
shareholders and federal, state and local government treasuries.  
 
The basic lesson from the above discussion is that lawmakers’ choices about the structure 
of a cap-and-trade system—and the way they dispose of the revenue generated—can have 
enormous distributional consequences throughout the economy. While supply and 
demand will determine who ultimately bears the burden of cap and trade, government has 
the power to create large winners and losers in the economy by controlling who receives 
the value of allowances. In Section III of this study we explore these large distributional 
impacts of cap and trade on U.S. households in detail.  
 
B. IMPACT ON THE BROADER U.S. ECONOMY 
In addition to raising prices throughout the economy, cap and trade has broader impacts 
on household income, employment and economic growth. Economists call these the 
“general equilibrium” effects of carbon policy. As noted above a cap-and-trade system 
restricts output and raises prices for carbon-intensive products. This in turn affects the 
broader economy in three distinct ways: (1) it permanently increases relative prices for 
carbon-intensive products; (2) it lowers real earnings for workers and owners of capital; 
and (3) it leads to potentially large adjustment costs to workers and companies currently 
operating in carbon-intensive industries. 
 
Permanent Price Impacts 
In the long run, cap and trade causes prices throughout the economy to rise by an amount 
roughly equal to the value of outstanding carbon allowances. If the federal government 
issues $150 billion in allowances, prices for carbon-intensive products will rise by 
approximately $150 billion in the aggregate. This occurs regardless of whether initial 
allowances are auctioned or distributed freely. The intuition behind this effect is that cap 
and trade introduces artificial scarcity in the market for carbon-intensive products, which 
is reflected in the price of tradable allowances. Requiring companies to hold these carbon 
allowances permanently raises their costs of production. As firms adjust to these cost 
increases, the burden of holding the allowances is ultimately passed forward to 
consumers in the form of higher prices throughout the economy.  
 
Reduced Returns to Labor and Capital  
Because cap and trade raises prices for carbon-intensive products throughout the 
economy, it has a secondary effect of lowering real returns to U.S. capital and labor. In 
effect, the price increases caused by cap and trade allow workers to buy fewer things with 
the same dollar amount of wages, lowering their income in real terms. Similarly, 
investors are able to buy less with the same dollar amount of capital income, lowering 
real returns to capital. These poorer returns reduce the supply of capital and labor 
throughout the economy, lowering household earnings, employment and economic 
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output. This indirect economic impact of cap and trade is known as the “tax interaction” 
effect of carbon policy.8 
 
 
Adjustment Costs to Workers and Companies  
As the economy adjusts to lower carbon emissions many workers and companies will 
face large adjustment costs. For example, workers in coal mining and petroleum 
extraction industries have highly specialized skills and earn high wages. Under cap and 
trade, many of these workers will face unemployment and lower wages as they move into 
other fields. Similarly, owners of capital in carbon-intensive industries will face 
temporary losses as returns are depressed. While the costs to capital owners will tend to 
be highly diffused throughout the economy, as most investors hold diversified portfolios 
of assets, the transition costs to workers will be highly concentrated in just a few 
industries and geographic regions throughout the country.9  
 
These broader economic impacts of climate policy are explored in detail in Section IV of 
this study, in which we illustrate how the impact of a typical cap-and-trade system on 
U.S. gross domestic product will in turn affect employment, household earnings and total 
economic output.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 For a thorough exploration of the theory and estimates of the “tax interaction” effect of climate policy, see 
Parry, Williams and Goulder (1999).  
9 It should be noted that these cost are transitional only. In the long run capital and labor will tend to 
migrate away from carbon-intensive industries and into other industries, returning wages and capital returns 
in carbon-intensive industries to their long-run levels. 
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III. DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF A CAP-AND-TRADE SYSTEM 
 
Because a cap-and-trade system restricts carbon emissions and raises prices, it imposes 
household burdens that are equivalent to a similarly designed carbon tax. In this section 
we present new estimates of the distributional impact of these burdens by income group, 
age, U.S. region and type of family. These estimates help illustrate which Americans 
would bear the ultimate cost of federal policy aimed at curbing greenhouse gas emissions.  
 
A basic lesson from the economics of taxation is that all taxes are ultimately borne by 
individuals rather than companies. Similarly, although cap and trade requires companies 
in the petroleum, coal and natural gas industries to bear the initial cost of tradable 
allowances, economists agree that the real economic burden is likely to be passed forward 
to households in the form of an invisible tax built into the price of consumer products 
throughout the economy. 
 
In this study we model the impact of a cap-and-trade system designed to cut U.S. carbon 
emissions by 15 percent compared to 2006 levels. This is a typical emissions-reduction 
goal for a wide range of climate change proposals, and is the one modeled by most U.S. 
Congressional Budget Office studies of cap and trade.10 The system is an “upstream” one; 
that is, only companies in coal mining and petroleum and natural gas extraction industries 
are required to hold carbon allowances.  
 
According to U.S. Congressional Budget 
Office estimates, a cap-and-trade system 
that cuts emissions by 15 percent 
corresponds to an allowance price of 
roughly $100 per metric ton of carbon.11 In 
Figure 1 this corresponds to the value 
labeled x in light gray in the right-hand 
panel which represents the increased 
production costs borne by companies 
producing carbon-intensive products. 
Using a standard input-output model we 
trace the burden of this cost increase down 
to the level of households.   
 
                                                 
10 See for example “Containing the Cost of a Cap-and-Trade Program for Carbon Dioxide Emissions,” 
CBO Testimony (May 20, 2008); “Trade-Offs in Allocating Allowances for CO2 Emissions,” CBO 
Economic and Budget Issue Brief (April 25, 2007); and “Who Gains and Who Pays Under Carbon-
Allowance Trading? The Distributional Effects of Alternative Policy Designs,” CBO Study (June 2000). 
11 See “Who Gains and Who Pays Under Carbon-Allowance Trading? The Distributional Effects of 
Alternative Policy Designs,” CBO Study (June 2000) and Lasky (2003). $100 per ton of carbon allowance 
price is based on a literature estimate for the price elasticity of carbon emissions of -0.57 and a pre-policy 
carbon price of $307 per ton.  
BOX 1. CARBON OR CARBON DIOXIDE? 
 
Some climate policies limit carbon, while others 
limit carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2). The 
relationship between them is that one metric ton 
of CO2 contains 12/44 tons of carbon.  
 
To convert from CO2 units to carbon, simply 
multiply by 12/44. For example, an allowance 
price of $100 per ton of carbon is equivalent to 
(12/44) x $100 or $27.27 per ton of CO2.  
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Table 1 summarizes the cap-and-trade system modeled in this study. In 2006, fossil-fuel 
carbon emissions in the U.S. were roughly 1.7 billion metric tons.12 A cap-and-trade 
system designed to cut emissions by 15 percent would restrict annual carbon emissions to 
1.45 billion tons. At an assumed allowance price of $100 per ton the total cap-and-trade 
burden to U.S. consumers would therefore be approximately $144.8 billion per year or 
$1,218 per household. This is the overall cap-and-trade burden estimate used throughout 
this study.  
 
TABLE 1. OVERVIEW OF THE CAP-AND-TRADE SYSTEM MODELED IN THIS STUDY 
Emissions Target (Reduction from 2006 Levels) 15 percent 
Allowance Price ($ per metric ton of carbon) $100 
Pre-Policy U.S. Carbon Emissions (Metric Tons) 1,703,181,818 
Post-Policy U.S. Carbon Emissions (Metric Tons) 1,447,704,545 
Total Value of Allowances Issued $144,770,454,545 
Source: Tax Foundation; U.S. Congressional Budget Office;  
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 
 
In this analysis we focus primarily on the burden of cap and trade to households in the 
form of higher consumer prices. As noted above, cap and trade also generates 
government revenue that may be disposed of by lawmakers in various ways that may 
affect these household burdens. Because of uncertainty about how lawmakers may or 
may not dispose of future cap-and-trade revenue, we present only household burdens 
from higher consumer prices throughout the body of the study. This is the approach 
followed by the U.S. Congressional Budget Office when presenting the household impact 
of higher prices from cap and trade, and we follow that convention in this study.13  
 
However, the distribution of government revenue from cap and trade can have a large 
impact on the net distribution impact of climate policy. To illustrate this impact, in Box 2 
we present an example of how the results of this study would change if both the burden 
and spending sides of climate policy are taken into account. The box illustrates the net 
fiscal incidence of a cap-and-trade system under a scenario in which initial allowances 
are freely distributed to companies and lawmakers return the extra corporate tax revenue 
generated from companies’ one-time profits in the form of an across-the-board revenue-
neutral corporate tax cut.14  
 
 
                                                 
12 See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2008), Figure 2-6, “2006 U.S. Fossil Carbon Flows.” Note 
that all units of CO2 are converted to carbon for this study.  
13 See for example U.S. Congressional Budget Office (2008), Table 1, page 14.  
14 Note that other net distributional scenarios (such as lump-sum rebates of cap-and-trade auction revenue 
to households) can easily be derived from the tables in this study. Various scenarios of how lawmakers may 
dispose of revenue to households can simply be subtracted from this study’s tables of household burdens. 
Many previous studies have explored these options; see for example Dinan and Rogers (2002),   
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BOX 2. HOW FEDERAL SPENDING AFFECTS CAP-AND-TRADE BURDENS 
 
In this study, we focus on the initial household burden of cap and trade. However, implementing such a 
system would also generate government revenue that—depending on how lawmakers spend it—can 
have a dramatic impact on net household burdens from climate policy.  
 
For example, if government sells initial allowances via auction with the proceeds distributed as lump-
sum transfers to U.S. households a household’s annual burden would be partly or totally offset by the 
subsequent transfer payment. The combined impact of household burdens and government spending 
benefits is known as the “net fiscal incidence” of climate policy.  
 
As an illustration, the table below presents the net fiscal incidence of a cap-and-trade system with freely 
distributed initial allowances. As noted in Section II of this study, free initial allowances create large 
one-time profits for companies that receive them. Governments recapture approximately 40 percent of 
these profits through federal, state and local corporate taxes, and the remaining 60 percent accrue to 
shareholders throughout the economy. In the table below we assume government returns these higher 
corporate tax collections to taxpayers in the form of an across-the-board corporate income tax cut.  
 
The table illustrates the impact of three factors on households: (1) the initial household cost of cap and 
trade, (2) minus the increased stock returns to shareholders, (3) minus the tax savings from a revenue-
neutral corporate tax cut. The first line presents the household cap-and-trade burden from Section III of 
this study. The second line shows the impact of higher stock returns to shareholders, and the third line 
shows households’ tax savings from the corporate tax cut.  
 
NET FISCAL INCIDENCE OF A CAP AND TRADE SYSTEM WITH FREE INITIAL ALLOWANCES  
AND A REVENUE-NEUTRAL CORPORATE TAX CUT 
 Quintiles of Cash Income Before Taxes (2006) 
 
Lowest 20 
Percent 
Second 20 
Percent 
Third 20 
Percent 
Fourth 20 
Percent 
Highest 20 
Percent 
Household Cap-and-Trade Burden $617 $863 $1,100 $1,418 $2,091 
Less: Higher Stock Returns from One-Time Profits ($42) ($139) ($307) ($664) ($2,499) 
Less: Tax Savings from Revenue-Neutral Corp. Tax Cut ($48) ($175) ($357) ($571) ($1,496) 
Net Household Burden $528 $548 $436 $182 ($1,904) 
Note: Assumes shareholders earn 60 percent of one-time corporate profits, while governments recapture 40 percent through 
corporate income taxes. Higher stock returns are distributed to households on the basis of dividend income. Reduced corporate 
tax burdens are assumed to fall 70 percent on labor income and 30 percent on capital income based on Randolph (2006).  
Source: Tax Foundation; 2007 Current Population Survey (March Supplement); 2006 Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). 
 
As is clear from the table, how lawmakers choose to dispose of revenue from a cap-and-trade system 
can have a dramatic impact on the fiscal incidence of climate policy. In this example, households in the 
top quintile actually profit by $1,904 per year on a net basis from cap and trade while households in the 
bottom four quintiles pay a net burden ranging from $182 to $548 per year. In total, such a policy 
would redistribute roughly $145 billion from the lowest-earning 80 percent of U.S. households to the 
nation’s highest-earning one-fifth. 
 
As is clear from this illustration, implementing a U.S. cap-and-trade system would transfer enormous 
power to federal lawmakers who choose how to dispose of the revenue generated from the system. In 
turn, these choices will have a dramatic impact on which Americans bear the ultimate cost of policy 
aimed at reducing U.S. greenhouse gas emissions.  
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A. BURDENS BY INCOME GROUP 
A well-known aspect of climate policy is that costs are regressively distributed across 
households. That is, lower-income households tend to spend a larger fraction of their 
income on carbon-intensive products like fuel and electricity than higher-income 
households. As a result, cap and trade tends to impose the heaviest relative burdens on 
households least able to bear them. This study confirms that finding.  
 
Table 2 presents the basic distribution of cap-and-trade burdens by income quintile. The 
quintiles contain equal numbers of households and all figures are for calendar year 2006, 
the most recent year for which data are available.15 As is clear from the table, higher-
income groups bear the largest dollar burden from cap and trade while lower-income 
groups bear the largest burden as a percentage of income. 
 
Households in the highest-earning quintile—those earning over $88,774 in cash 
income—bear an annual cap-and-trade burden of $2,091 per year or 1.4 percent of 
income. Households in the middle quintile earning between $35,095 and $56,222 pay an 
annual burden of $1,100 or 2.4 percent of income. And households in the lowest-earning 
quintile—those earning less than $18,370 per year—pay $612 per year or a substantial 
6.2 percent of income. 
 
TABLE 2. ANNUAL BURDEN OF A U.S. CAP-AND-TRADE SYSTEM BY INCOME QUINTILE 
    Quintiles of Cash Income Before Taxes, Equal Number of Households 
  
All 
Households 
Lowest 20 
Percent 
Second 20 
Percent 
Third 20 
Percent 
Fourth 20 
Percent 
Highest 20 
Percent 
Lower Bound of Household Income n/a n/a $18,370 $35,095 $56,222 $88,774 
Average Annual Household Burden $1,218  $617  $863  $1,100  $1,418  $2,091  
Household Burden as a % of Income 2.0% 6.2% 3.2% 2.4% 2.0% 1.4% 
Aggregate Burden ($ billion) $144.8  $14.6  $20.5  $26.1  $33.7  $49.8  
Note: Assumes a 15 percent emissions reduction and an allowance price of $100 per ton of carbon.  
Source: Tax Foundation Input-Output Model; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
 
Figures 2 and 3 present the figures from Table 2 graphically. Figure 2 illustrates the 
annual household dollar burden from cap and trade by income quintile, and Figure 3 
presents annual burdens as a percentage of household cash income. As expected, as 
income and therefore consumption rises households bear a larger dollar burden from a 
cap-and-trade system. However, as a fraction of income the lowest-earning households in 
the nation bear the heaviest price for policy aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions.  
 
                                                 
15 The household income concept employed is cash income before taxes as defined by the U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics’ Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). It consists of wages and salaries; self-employment 
income; Social Security, private and government retirement; interest, dividends, rental income, and other 
property income; unemployment, workers’ compensation and veteran’s benefits; public assistance, 
supplemental security income, and food stamps; alimony and child support; and other cash income 
including scholarships, and stipends. See www.bls.gov/bls/glossary.htm. 
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FIGURE 2. ANNUAL HOUSEHOLD BURDEN FROM A U.S. CAP-AND-TRADE  
SYSTEM BY CASH INCOME QUINTILE 
 
Source: Tax Foundation Input-Output Model. 
 
FIGURE 3. ANNUAL CAP-AND-TRADE BURDEN AS A PERCENTAGE  
OF HOUSEHOLD CASH INCOME 
 
Source: Tax Foundation Input-Output Model. 
 
Dollar Income Groups 
One drawback of the quintile presentations in Figures 2 and 3 is that they mask 
considerable variation in cap-and-trade burdens between households within the same 
income quintile. In Figures 4 and 5 we present a more detailed view of cap-and-trade 
burdens by dividing U.S. households into twelve groups based on household cash 
income.16  
 
                                                 
16 Due to significant under-reporting of income among low-income households, we do not present results 
for households reporting cash incomes of less than $5,000 per year.  
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As is clear from Figures 4 and 5, there are large differences in burdens within quintiles. 
For example, annual burdens in the top quintile range from $1,825 for those earning 
between $100,000 and $120,000 per year to more than $2,700 for those earning $150,000 
per year or more. Figure 5 further emphasizes the regressive nature of cap and trade 
which consumes 6.4 percent of income for households earning between $5,000 and 
$10,000 per year compared to just 1.1 percent for those earning over $150,000 per year.  
 
FIGURE 4. ANNUAL CAP-AND-TRADE BURDEN BY HOUSEHOLD CASH INCOME GROUP 
 
Source: Tax Foundation Input-Output Model. 
 
FIGURE 5. CAP-AND-TRADE BURDEN AS A PERCENTAGE OF HOUSEHOLD CASH INCOME 
 
Source: Tax Foundation Input-Output Model. 
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B. BURDENS BY AGE GROUP 
An often-overlooked aspect of climate policy is how cap-and-trade burdens would be 
borne by different age groups. Consumption patterns vary widely as households move 
from youth through working years and ultimately into retirement. These shifting 
consumption patterns in turn influence the degree to which households purchase carbon-
intensive products which determines their household burden from climate policy.  
 
Household income and consumption generally follow a mound-shaped distribution across 
the life cycle. Income and consumption begin at relatively low levels, rising throughout 
the working years until reaching a peak just before retirement. In old age, income and 
consumption tend to return to lower levels as households retire from the labor market. 
Because households on average save some portion of their income, as income expands 
consumption for most items tends to grow more slowly. The result is that consumption as 
a percentage of household income tends to be highest in youth and old age, and lowest in 
the prime earning years of 45-64.17 
 
These demographic patterns are clear in Table 3, which presents the basic distribution of 
cap-and-trade burdens by age group. In general, the lowest dollar burdens from cap and 
trade are borne by the youngest and oldest households in the nation while the highest 
dollar burdens are borne by middle-aged households in their prime earning years. 
Households under 25 years bear an annual burden of $696 which rises to $1,430 per year 
for households between 45 and 54 years and then declines to $830 per year for retired 
households aged 75 and older.  
 
TABLE 3. ANNUAL BURDEN OF A U.S. CAP-AND-TRADE SYSTEM BY AGE GROUP 
    Age of Household Head 
  
All 
Households 
Under 25 
Years 
25-34 
Years 
35-44 
Years 
45-54 
Years 
55-64 
Years 
65-74 
Years 
75 Years 
and 
Older 
Annual Household Burden $1,218  $696  $1,130  $1,389  $1,430  $1,329  $1,130  $830  
Household Burden as a % of Income 2.0% 2.4% 2.0% 1.8% 1.9% 2.1% 2.5% 2.8% 
Aggregate Burden ($ billions) $144.8  $5.7  $22.7  $33.3  $35.3  $25.2  $13.3  $9.3  
Source: Tax Foundation Input-Output Model. 
 
As a percentage of income, cap-and-trade burdens by age group reflect the underlying 
regressive nature of climate policy. When incomes are lowest in youth and old age cap 
and trade imposes the heaviest relative burden on households. Households over age 75 
bear the heaviest burden at 2.8 percent of income followed by households aged 65-75 at 
2.5 percent and the youngest households under age 25 at 2.4 percent.  
 
By contrast, cap-and-trade burdens comprise just 1.8 percent of income for higher-
earning households aged 35-44 and 1.9 percent of income for the highest-earning 
households between 45 and 54 years. In terms of aggregate burden, working-age 
                                                 
17 For a comprehensive review of household income and tax burdens by U.S. age group, see Chamberlain 
and Prante (2007b). 
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households aged 35 to 54 bear an annual burden for cap and trade of roughly $69 billion 
per year—47 percent of the total U.S. burden.  
 
Figures 6 and 7 present the figures from Table 3 graphically. Figure 6 shows the annual 
dollar amount of cap-and-trade burden by age group and Figure 7 presents cap-and-trade 
burdens as a percentage of household cash income. As noted above, the figures are 
essentially mirror images of each other. Households pay low dollar burdens and high 
burdens as a percentage of income in youth and old age, and pay large dollar burdens and 
low burdens as a percentage of income in their prime working years of age 35 to 64. 
 
FIGURE 6. ANNUAL HOUSEHOLD BURDEN FROM A U.S. CAP-AND-TRADE  
SYSTEM BY AGE OF HOUSEHOLD HEAD 
 
Source: Tax Foundation Input-Output Model. 
 
FIGURE 7. ANNUAL CAP-AND-TRADE BURDEN AS A PERCENTAGE  
OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME BY AGE GROUP 
 
Source: Tax Foundation Input-Output Model. 
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C. BURDENS BY U.S. REGION 
As with all federal policy, cap-and-trade burdens do not fall equally on the cities, states 
and regions that comprise the geographic landscape of the United States. In this section 
we briefly explore the geographic burden of a typical federal cap-and-trade system.  
 
To the extent that consumption of carbon-intensive products varies among U.S. regions 
household cap and trade burdens will vary as well. For example, households in the South 
spend on average 4.2 percent of household income on carbon-intensive gasoline and 
motor oil compared to 3 percent for households in the Northeast. Similarly, southern 
households spend on average 2.8 percent of income on electricity—another carbon-heavy 
expenditure—compared to 1.6 percent for households in the west. These differences in 
purchasing patterns help drive geographic differences in cap-and-trade burdens.  
 
Table 4 presents the basic distribution of cap-and-trade burdens by U.S. region.18 Overall, 
the results are more tightly clustered around the national average than burdens by income 
or age group. This clustering is largely the result having organized the nation’s roughly 
120 million households into just four regional categories. However, important regional 
differences are still apparent even from this highly aggregated view.  
 
TABLE 4. ANNUAL BURDEN OF A U.S. CAP-AND-TRADE SYSTEM BY U.S. REGION 
    U.S. Region 
  
All 
Households Northeast Midwest South West 
Annual Household Burden $1,218  $1,292  $1,156  $1,157  $1,318  
Household Burden as a % of Income 2.01% 2.01% 1.99% 2.06% 1.97% 
Aggregate Burden ($ billions) $144.8  $29.4  $31.4  $49.1  $34.8  
Source: Tax Foundation Input-Output Model. 
 
In terms of dollar amounts residents in the West—a region dominated by the State of 
California—bear the largest annual cap-and-trade burden of $1,318 per year. Households 
in the Midwest and South are essentially tied for having the smallest average dollar 
burden at $1,156 and $1,157 per year, respectively. In terms of burdens as a percentage 
of income, residents in the South bear the heaviest burden at 2.06 percent of income. This 
finding is consistent with the regressive impact of cap and trade discussed above, as 
Southern households have the lowest average incomes in the nation. The lowest burdens 
as a percentage of income are borne by the nation’s highest-income households in the 
West.  
 
                                                 
18 The regional classifications are drawn from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Consumer Expenditure 
Survey (CEX). “Midwest” includes Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, 
Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and Wisconsin; “Northeast” includes Connecticut, Maine, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont; 
“South” includes Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, 
and West Virginia; and “West” includes Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, 
Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. 
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Figures 8 and 9 present the figures from Table 4 graphically. As is clear from the figures, 
the regressive nature of cap and trade is apparent even at this broad regional level as the 
heaviest burdens as a percentage of income are borne by low-income households in the 
South, while the nation’s highest-income households in the West bear the lightest relative 
burden.19  
 
FIGURE 8. ANNUAL HOUSEHOLD BURDEN FROM A U.S.  
CAP-AND-TRADE SYSTEM BY U.S. REGION 
 
Source: Tax Foundation Input-Output Model. 
 
FIGURE 9. ANNUAL CAP-AND-TRADE BURDEN AS A PERCENTAGE  
OF HOUSEHOLD CASH INCOME BY U.S. REGION 
 
Source: Tax Foundation Input-Output Model. 
                                                 
19 In addition to the cap-and-trade burden from higher consumer prices measured here, it should be noted 
that cap-and-trade results in potentially large adjustment costs to workers and companies in carbon-
intensive industries such as coal and oil extraction, many of whom are concentrated in particular states and 
regions. While this study does not estimate these burdens, it should be noted that including those costs will 
tend to amplify the regional differences in cap-and-trade burdens presented in Figures 8 and 9.  
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D. BURDENS BY TYPE OF FAMILY 
Household income and consumption in the United States tend to be correlated with other 
household characteristics such as marital status and the presence of children. As a result, 
the regressive impact of cap and trade has the unanticipated side effect of imposing a 
disproportionate annual burden on some types of U.S. families over others. 
 
On average, the nation’s highest earning households are married couples with children 
aged 18 years or older. The average age for these head-of-households is 52 years, placing 
them squarely in what are typically the peak earning years for most families. In 2006 
these households earned an average of roughly $94,000 per year—55 percent higher than 
the U.S. national average.  
 
By contrast, the nation’s lowest-earning households are single parents with at least one 
child aged 18 years or less. The average age for these head-of-households is just 38, a full 
decade younger than the U.S. national average. These households earned an average 
household cash income of $34,850 in 2006, just 58 percent of the nation’s average.  
 
These patterns in household income are apparent in Table 5, which presents estimates of 
annual household cap-and-trade burdens for various types of U.S. families. Overall, there 
are significant differences in cap-and-trade burdens by family type, a finding that largely 
mirrors existing differences in household income and the consumption of carbon-
intensive products.  
 
TABLE 5. ANNUAL BURDEN OF A U.S. CAP-AND-TRADE SYSTEM BY TYPE OF FAMILY 
      Husband and Wife with Children       
  
All 
Households 
Husband 
and Wife 
Only 
Husband 
and Wife 
with 
Children: 
Oldest 
Child 
Under 6 
Husband 
and Wife 
with 
Children: 
Oldest 
Child 6 to 
17 
Husband 
and Wife 
with 
Children: 
Oldest 
Child 18 
or Older 
Other 
Husband 
and Wife 
One 
Parent, 
at Least 
One 
Child 
Under 
18 
Single 
Person 
and 
Others 
Annual Household Burden $1,218  $1,410  $1,428  $1,669  $1,785  $1,701  $950  $873  
Household Burden as a % of Income 2.0% 1.9% 1.8% 1.9% 1.9% 2.0% 2.7% 2.2% 
Aggregate Burden ($ billions) $144.8  $35.7  $8.2  $25.3  $15.1  $8.1  $6.9  $45.5  
Source: Tax Foundation Input-Output Model. 
 
The largest dollar burden from cap and trade is borne by the nation’s highest earning and 
highest consuming household type: married couples with at least one child aged 18 or 
older. These households bear an annual burden of $1,785 per year. The smallest dollar 
burdens are borne by single households with no children at $873 per year followed by 
single parents with at least one child under age 18 at $950.  
 
In terms of burden as a percentage of income, single parents with young children bear the 
heaviest burden from climate policy at 2.7 percent of income. By contrast, married 
couples with children under age 6 bear the lightest relative burden at just 1.8 percent of 
household cash income.  
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In Figures 10 and 11 we present the figures from Table 5 graphically. These images 
further underscore a theme that runs throughout the findings of this study: the burden of a 
U.S. cap-and-trade system would represent a significant annual cost to most household 
budgets, and the burdens would tend to fall most heavily on American families with 
relatively low cash incomes who are least able to bear it.  
 
FIGURE 10. ANNUAL HOUSEHOLD BURDEN FROM A U.S. 
CAP-AND-TRADE SYSTEM BY TYPE OF FAMILY 
 
Source: Tax Foundation Input-Output Model. 
 
FIGURE 11. ANNUAL CAP-AND-TRADE BURDEN AS A PERCENTAGE  
OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME BY TYPE OF FAMILY 
 
Source: Tax Foundation Input-Output Model. 
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E. COMPARING CAP-AND-TRADE BURDENS TO OTHER HOUSEHOLD TAX BURDENS 
The previous sections present household cap-and-trade burdens by income, age, region 
and family type. In this section we place those burdens in a broader context by comparing 
them to the annual cost of other federal, state and local taxes borne by U.S. households.  
 
Table 6 presents a comparison of annual cap-and-trade burdens to the burden of other 
existing federal and state-local taxes. The household tax burden estimates by income 
quintile are derived from a comprehensive 2007 study of U.S. tax burdens from the Tax 
Foundation,20 which are inflation-adjusted to 2006 dollars. As is clear from the table, 
annual cap-and-trade burdens are broadly comparable to other tax burdens.  
 
TABLE 6. ANNUAL CAP-AND-TRADE BURDENS COMPARED TO OTHER  
EXISTING TAXES PAID BY U.S. HOUSEHOLDS 
  Quintiles of Cash Income Before Taxes, Equal Number of Households 
  
Bottom 20 
Percent 
Second 20 
Percent 
Third 20 
Percent 
Fourth 20 
Percent 
Top 20 
Percent 
Annual Cap and Trade Burden $617  $863  $1,100  $1,418  $2,091  
      
Federal Tax Burdens           
Income  $71  $947  $2,817  $6,737  $27,066  
Payroll  $656  $2,829  $5,835  $9,951  $18,405  
Corporate Income  $183  $817  $1,514  $2,609  $6,361  
Gasoline  $61  $123  $187  $273  $493  
Alcoholic Beverages  $33  $45  $70  $95  $151  
Tobacco  $50  $66  $79  $76  $63  
Diesel Fuel  $7  $31  $57  $98  $239  
Air Transport  $17  $46  $70  $120  $316  
Other Excise  $40  $62  $83  $115  $189  
Customs, Duties, etc.  $90  $138  $187  $257  $422  
Estate & Gift  $0  $0  $0  $0  $1,155  
      
State-Local Tax Burdens           
Income  $35  $389  $1,071  $2,274  $6,803  
Corporate Income  $32  $144  $267  $460  $1,121  
Personal Property  $12  $33  $47  $61  $115  
Motor Vehicle License  $60  $100  $133  $160  $186  
Other Personal Taxes  $7  $17  $28  $45  $96  
General Sales  $753  $1,371  $1,953  $2,952  $4,910  
Gasoline  $85  $171  $262  $381  $688  
Alcoholic Beverages  $18  $25  $38  $52  $82  
Tobacco  $86  $115  $136  $131  $109  
Public Utilities  $119  $164  $199  $234  $298  
Insurance Receipts  $59  $102  $129  $158  $237  
Other Selective Sales  $113  $174  $235  $323  $531  
Motor Vehicle (Business)  $6  $25  $47  $81  $198  
Severance  $20  $37  $53  $75  $139  
Property  $876  $1,609  $2,373  $3,512  $7,120  
Special Assessments  $17  $32  $47  $69  $140  
Other Production Taxes  $36  $161  $298  $514  $1,254  
Estate & Gift  $0  $0  $0  $0  $268  
Note: All figures in 2006 inflation-adjusted dollars. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Chamberlain and Prante (2007a). 
                                                 
20 See Chamberlain and Prante (2007a). While figures in the published study present tax burdens in 
quintiles with equal numbers of individuals, the underlying microdata model allows the presentation of tax 
burdens in quintiles with equal numbers of households. These unpublished figures in quintiles with equal 
numbers of households serve as the basis for the figures in Table 6.  
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For households in the lowest-earning quintile, the $617 cap-and-trade burden represents a 
significant annual cost. Among federal taxes, cap-and-trade burdens would exceed every 
tax for these households except the federal payroll tax, which costs an average of $656 
per year. In essence, the household burden from cap-and-trade would be equivalent to a 
94 percent increase in the federal payroll tax paid by these households. Similarly, cap-
and-trade burdens are equivalent to an 82 percent increase in state-local sales taxes, a 70 
percent increase in property taxes, or a four-fold increase in the combined federal and 
state-local gas tax paid by these households. 
 
For households with middle- and upper-incomes cap-and-trade burdens are less dramatic 
but still represent a significant annual cost. For households in the middle 20 percent of 
earners the $1,100 annual cost of cap and trade is approximately equal to the average 
amount of state and local personal income taxes paid per year of $1,071. Cap-and-trade 
burdens for the middle quintile are comparable to a 46 percent increase in state and local 
property taxes, a 39 percent increase in federal personal income taxes, or a roughly 
doubling of the combined federal and state-local gas tax paid by these households.  
 
For households in the highest-earning quintile, the $2,091 annual cap-and-trade burden 
appears modest in comparison to the existing large federal, state and local tax burdens 
currently paid by these households. Cap-and-trade burdens for this group are equivalent 
to an 8 percent increase in federal personal income taxes, a 29 percent increase in state 
and local property taxes, or a 43 percent increase in state and local sales taxes borne by 
these households. One interesting finding is that the annual cap-and-trade burden to the 
nation’s highest-earning households would exceed the $1,423 average burden of the 
highly controversial state and federal estate taxes by more than $600 per year.  
 
F. IMPACT ON CONSUMER PRICES 
The basic mechanism by which the economic costs of climate policy are transferred from 
carbon-emitting firms to carbon-consuming households is through higher consumer 
prices. In general, carbon-intensive products that rely heavily on coal, petroleum and 
natural gas as productive inputs will face the largest price increases. However, a key 
finding from previous studies is that because nearly all industries make some use of fossil 
fuels cap-and-trade burdens tend to be highly diffused throughout prices across the 
economy with nearly every product facing some degree of price increase. 
 
Table 7 presents the basic commodity-level price impacts from a typical cap-and-trade 
system with a $100 per ton allowance price. As expected, the largest price increases are 
for fossil-fuel products. Petroleum and coal products rise 18.2 percent; natural gas rises 
17.6 percent; electric power rises 15.1 percent; and coal mining rises 14.7 percent. 
However, a wide range of chemicals, metals, services and household products also face 
significant price increases. This diffused nature of cap-and-trade burdens largely masks 
the overall cost of climate policy to consumers. Unlike a federal carbon tax, cap and trade 
does not produce official tax revenue figures that can be easily monitored by the public—
likely the source of cap-and-trade’s persistent political appeal to U.S. lawmakers.  
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TABLE 7. IMPACT ON CONSUMER PRICES FROM A $100/TON CARBON ALLOWANCE PRICE 
Commodity 
Percentage 
Price Increase 
Distribution of Cap 
and Trade Burden 
Percentage of 
Total Burden 
Petroleum and coal products 18.2% $28,094,623,659  19.4% 
Natural gas distribution 17.6% $7,841,922,604  5.4% 
Electric power generation, transmission, and distribution 15.1% $18,068,994,987  12.5% 
Coal mining 14.7% $1,435,031,376  1.0% 
Primary ferrous metal products 7.7% $2,455,297,517  1.7% 
Basic chemicals 7.5% $4,121,138,684  2.8% 
State and local government enterprises 7.1% $1,757,639,490  1.2% 
Pipeline transportation 7.0% $745,605,695  0.5% 
Water, sewage and other systems 6.5% $1,352,321,999  0.9% 
Resins, rubber, and artificial fibers 4.9% $1,527,606,437  1.1% 
Agricultural chemicals 3.8% $409,365,832  0.3% 
Metal ores mining 3.5% $135,256,536  0.1% 
Air transportation 3.4% $1,669,936,336  1.2% 
Paints, coatings, and adhesives 3.1% $418,511,216  0.3% 
Other chemical products 3.0% $527,699,270  0.4% 
Transit and ground passenger transportation 2.9% $561,589,933  0.4% 
Nonmetallic mineral mining and quarrying 2.9% $263,794,649  0.2% 
Pulp, paper, and paperboard 2.8% $1,077,476,678  0.7% 
Courier and messenger services 2.5% $741,982,519  0.5% 
Primary nonferrous metal products 2.5% $587,134,568  0.4% 
Forgings and stampings 2.5% $256,295,583  0.2% 
Nonmetallic mineral products 2.4% $1,170,736,245  0.8% 
Animal products 2.4% $1,177,707,336  0.8% 
Yarn, fabrics, and other textile mill products 2.4% $449,183,173  0.3% 
Truck transportation 2.3% $2,339,302,920  1.6% 
Crop products 2.1% $1,512,591,166  1.0% 
Oil and gas extraction 2.0% $867,557,436  0.6% 
Boilers, tanks, and shipping containers 2.0% $211,957,099  0.1% 
Foundry products 2.0% $243,163,291  0.2% 
Fish and other nonfarm animals 2.0% $71,509,347  0.0% 
Plastics and rubber products 2.0% $1,817,584,791  1.3% 
Mining support services 1.9% $311,268,156  0.2% 
Architectural and structural metal products 1.9% $514,041,661  0.4% 
Scenic and sightseeing transportation and support activities 1.8% $468,382,793  0.3% 
Converted paper products 1.8% $727,317,557  0.5% 
Amusements, gambling, and recreation 1.6% $861,155,520  0.6% 
Soaps, cleaning compounds, and toiletries 1.5% $690,739,520  0.5% 
Other fabricated metal products 1.5% $889,868,839  0.6% 
Food products 1.5% $4,350,986,398  3.0% 
New nonresidential construction 1.5% $3,224,180,497  2.2% 
Support activities for agriculture and forestry 1.4% $107,821,300  0.1% 
Nonapparel textile products 1.4% $361,708,973  0.2% 
All other administrative and support services 1.4% $1,854,353,984  1.3% 
Rail transportation 1.4% $279,860,605  0.2% 
Motor vehicle bodies, trailers, and parts 1.4% $1,530,257,652  1.1% 
Other electrical equipment and components 1.4% $247,665,538  0.2% 
Agriculture, construction, and mining machinery 1.3% $290,370,551  0.2% 
New residential construction 1.3% $2,667,202,832  1.8% 
Maintenance and repair construction 1.2% $867,332,717  0.6% 
Other general purpose machinery 1.2% $328,947,491  0.2% 
Metalworking machinery 1.2% $145,202,768  0.1% 
HVAC and commercial refrigeration equipment 1.2% $187,210,849  0.1% 
Commercial and service industry machinery 1.1% $127,662,639  0.1% 
Wood products 1.1% $500,909,665  0.3% 
Industrial machinery 1.1% $165,496,716  0.1% 
Electrical equipment 1.1% $159,932,490  0.1% 
Cutlery and handtools 1.1% $86,127,589  0.1% 
Printed products 1.1% $395,417,981  0.3% 
Household appliances 1.1% $176,798,954  0.1% 
General state and local government services 1.0% $5,200,971,378  3.6% 
Beverage products 1.0% $661,762,473  0.5% 
Motor vehicles 1.0% $1,462,441,385  1.0% 
Turbine and power transmission equipment 1.0% $178,368,838  0.1% 
Educational services 1.0% $966,838,853  0.7% 
Magnetic media products 1.0% $37,754,877  0.0% 
Electric lighting equipment 1.0% $75,647,411  0.1% 
Semiconductors and electronic components 1.0% $528,587,963  0.4% 
Furniture and related products 1.0% $529,193,686  0.4% 
Warehousing and storage 1.0% $196,288,121  0.1% 
Forestry and logging products 1.0% $161,866,933  0.1% 
All other industries (64 industries) <1.0% $28,341,992,020  19.6% 
Total n/a $144,770,454,545  100.0% 
Note: Complete table of 134 commodity-level price impacts is available from the author upon request. 
Distribution of cap-and-trade burden is determined by weighting price impacts by total commodity output. 
Source: Tax Foundation Input-Output Model. 
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IV. ECONOMIC IMPACT OF A CAP-AND-TRADE SYSTEM 
 
Because cap and trade raises prices for consumer products it has the effect of lowering 
real returns to labor and capital throughout the economy. This in turn reduces the supply 
of these productive inputs, lowering overall U.S. economic output. In this section we 
make use of RIMS II multipliers from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis to explore 
the likely impact of this “tax interaction” effect on jobs, household earnings and total 
output for the U.S. economy.  
 
A. IMPACT ON EMPLOYMENT, HOUSEHOLD EARNINGS AND ECONOMIC OUTPUT 
Previous studies from the U.S. Congressional Budget Office and others have estimated 
the impact of various cap-and-trade proposals on U.S. gross domestic product. Table 8 
presents two typical estimates. Both estimates assume initial cap-and-trade allowances 
are distributed by auction. In the first scenario, auction revenue is returned to taxpayers in 
the form of a revenue-neutral corporate or payroll tax cut. In the second scenario auction 
proceeds are returned directly to households in the form of an equal lump-sum 
government transfer payment.   
 
TABLE 8. CBO ESTIMATES OF REDUCED GDP FROM A TYPICAL CAP-AND-TRADE SYSTEM 
  Reduced U.S. GDP 
Policy Percentage Dollars (2008) 
Revenue from Allowance Sales Used to Cut Corporate or Payroll Taxes 0.13% $18,757,960,000  
Revenue from Allowance Sales Used to Provide Equal Lump-Sum Rebates to Households 0.34% $49,059,280,000  
Source: U.S. Congressional Budget Office based on Dinan and Rogers (2002). 
 
According to CBO estimates, cap and trade with auctioned allowances and a corporate or 
payroll tax cut will reduce annual GDP by $18.8 billion in 2008 dollars or 0.13 percent 
from the current baseline in the long run. By contrast, a system with auctioned 
allowances and a lump-sum transfer payment to households will cut annual GDP by 
$49.1 billion or 0.34 percent in the long run. These estimates represent the range of likely 
impacts from cap and trade on the broader U.S. economy.21  
 
Using input-output analysis it is possible to illustrate how these initial changes in GDP 
from cap and trade will likely affect output, employment and earnings in the overall 
economy. Input-output analysis relies on an accounting framework that divides the U.S. 
economy into distinct industries. Each industry buys inputs from itself and other 
industries, combines them with value added, and sells the resulting products as 
intermediate inputs to other industries or as final demand to consumers, governments and 
                                                 
21 It should be noted that GDP only measures the value of final goods and services produced, and therefore 
is not a true measure of overall welfare. Leisure, household production, environmental quality and other 
factors that influence welfare are not captured by GDP. These limitations should be kept in mind when 
interpreting the economic impact estimates in Section IV of this study.   
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the rest of the world. These economic linkages are typically summarized in an input-
output or “Leontief” table after the 1973 Nobel Laureate economist Wassily Leontief.  
 
One of the most common uses of input-output analysis is to estimate the regional 
“multiplier effect” from a policy change that affects GDP. For example, the impact of 
closing a $100 million per year military base is larger than $100 million dollars for the 
affected region. The reason is that military bases purchase large amounts of food, fuel 
and other supplies from companies in the area. Closing the base cuts jobs, earnings and 
output in these supplying industries as well. The total economic impact of the policy 
therefore should include the direct impact of the base closing as well as the indirect or 
“induced” impact felt by other local industries.  
 
The most widely used regional input-output multipliers are from the U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis’ “Regional Impact Modeling System” (RIMS II).22 RIMS II 
multipliers are derived from the official U.S. national input-out tables, and allow users to 
estimate the order-of-magnitude impacts of any initial change in household earnings, 
employment or final demand on the broader economy. 
 
Table 9 provides estimates of the economic impact of a typical cap-and-trade system on 
jobs, household earnings and total U.S. output. The figures are based on the CBO’s 
second cap-and-trade scenario from Table 8, which corresponds to a 0.34 percent initial 
reduction in GDP. As a result, these figures represent upper-bound estimates of cap-and-
trade’s likely economic impact.   
 
As the price increases from cap and trade lower returns to labor and capital, discouraging 
their supply in various industries, those industries suffer initial reductions in output. This 
initial decline in output in turn leads to declining revenue in complementary industries, 
job losses, reductions in household earnings, and ultimately to lower overall economic 
output for the economy.  
 
Overall, a cap-and-trade system that reduces annual GDP by 0.34 percent per year can be 
expected to reduce U.S. employment by roughly 964,900 jobs per year, reduce household 
earnings by $37.8 billion, and reduce total U.S. economic output by $136.1 billion. 
Because overall usage of labor and capital inputs by industries is highly correlated with 
industry output, these estimates assume initial GDP reductions from cap-and-trade’s “tax 
interaction” effect are distributed across industries on the basis of GDP by industry.  
 
To the extent that GDP losses from climate policy are more heavily concentrated in 
particular industries, these overall impacts by industry will also differ. Due to uncertainty 
in the underlying data and the many assumptions involved in such a calculation, the 
economic impacts presented in Table 9 should be considered illustrative order-of-
magnitude estimates rather than precise figures.  
 
                                                 
22 See Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Regional Input-Output Modeling System (RIMS II).” Available 
online at www.bea.gov/regional/rims/. 
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TABLE 9. ECONOMIC IMPACT OF A CAP-AND-TRADE SYSTEM THAT REDUCES GDP 0.34 
PERCENT (AUCTIONED INITIAL ALLOWANCES, LUMP-SUM REBATE TO HOUSEHOLDS) 
  Economic Impact of GDP Losses from a U.S. Cap-and-Trade System 
RIMS II Industry 
Initial Reduction in 
U.S. GDP 
Reduced Total 
Economic Output 
Reduced 
Household 
Earnings 
Reduced 
Employment 
(Job Losses) 
Farms $418,372,935  $1,257,545,369  $267,884,190  10,141 
Forestry, fishing, and related activities $129,219,778  $423,168,931  $121,918,861  4,268 
Oil and gas extraction $691,122,243  $1,654,408,424  $422,206,578  7,198 
Mining, except oil and gas $191,188,759  $477,704,233  $125,955,154  2,466 
Support activities for mining $257,221,315  $663,630,993  $156,982,169  3,271 
Utilities $1,070,649,617  $2,370,739,447  $496,246,097  9,051 
Construction $2,925,762,152  $9,460,744,495  $2,936,294,896  73,309 
Wood products $160,848,153  $521,212,355  $133,069,677  3,713 
Nonmetallic mineral products $236,405,821  $702,007,085  $180,992,297  4,052 
Primary metals $286,529,083  $764,774,776  $167,533,555  3,568 
Fabricated metal products $572,090,919  $1,698,537,938  $439,937,917  10,091 
Machinery $527,278,771  $1,570,921,644  $406,373,749  8,748 
Computer and electronic products $582,691,722  $1,821,261,246  $527,918,700  10,415 
Electrical equipment and appliances $193,069,032  $570,789,286  $144,454,250  3,130 
Motor vehicles, bodies and trailers, and parts $418,448,146  $1,381,297,330  $318,606,418  6,867 
Other transportation equipment $395,364,518  $1,140,784,781  $325,384,999  6,396 
Furniture and related products $132,158,689  $419,114,849  $110,630,038  2,866 
Miscellaneous manufacturing $290,955,595  $900,129,324  $262,121,896  5,481 
Food and beverage and tobacco products $714,980,718  $2,465,325,013  $548,461,709  14,280 
Textile mills and textile product mills $82,641,924  $276,271,951  $66,997,808  1,661 
Apparel and leather and allied products $67,963,990  $210,688,368  $62,642,409  1,707 
Paper products $227,042,937  $699,610,106  $163,720,662  3,724 
Printing and related support activities $196,742,123  $618,439,189  $177,736,834  4,177 
Petroleum and coal products $383,025,994  $875,597,421  $173,932,104  3,042 
Chemical products $871,925,774  $2,596,769,340  $579,133,099  11,567 
Plastics and rubber products $304,933,018  $938,156,923  $216,929,349  4,957 
Wholesale trade $3,456,545,665  $9,185,424,449  $2,767,656,114  60,975 
Retail trade $3,580,348,508  $9,867,440,489  $2,943,762,544  94,979 
Air transportation $217,754,390  $625,651,912  $161,813,287  3,650 
Rail transportation $150,273,149  $386,532,594  $99,480,825  2,084 
Water transportation $42,942,806  $130,700,726  $31,588,728  713 
Truck transportation $541,437,225  $1,685,277,508  $487,889,084  12,261 
Transit and ground passenger transportation $78,413,059  $248,875,208  $77,534,833  2,879 
Pipeline transportation $62,920,049  $173,256,646  $37,330,465  751 
Other transportation and support activities $423,534,503  $1,167,388,150  $422,941,554  9,826 
Warehousing and storage $170,739,262  $465,554,746  $164,695,092  4,515 
Publishing industries (includes software) $607,312,801  $1,737,764,848  $474,372,029  10,461 
Motion picture and sound recording $187,410,723  $577,749,776  $151,634,016  3,674 
Broadcasting and telecommunications $1,408,114,852  $3,972,010,375  $882,888,012  19,185 
Information and data processing services $298,887,722  $874,276,477  $227,304,113  5,256 
Federal Reserve banks, credit intermediation $2,384,505,958  $5,336,285,883  $1,473,624,682  31,520 
Securities, commodities and investments $944,512,174  $3,148,531,332  $1,068,432,171  20,685 
Insurance carriers and related activities $1,211,997,155  $3,830,153,408  $1,066,557,496  22,786 
Funds, trusts, and other financial vehicles $110,613,823  $431,648,323  $126,553,275  2,439 
Real estate $6,787,312,012  $13,205,394,251  $2,214,699,910  66,153 
Rental and leasing services  $640,524,540  $1,886,985,293  $458,551,518  11,519 
Miscellaneous prof., sci. and tech. services $2,561,098,990  $7,795,985,325  $2,630,248,663  57,644 
Management of companies and enterprises $1,034,671,253  $3,113,118,867  $990,387,324  19,240 
Administrative and support services $1,549,496,934  $4,572,255,554  $1,473,261,685  47,608 
Waste management and remediation  $148,418,675  $431,824,136  $115,855,618  2,726 
Educational services $491,486,686  $1,533,880,798  $507,607,449  16,119 
Ambulatory health care services $2,012,919,456  $5,993,668,973  $2,059,417,896  47,726 
Hospitals and nursing  $1,533,986,870  $4,935,909,553  $1,615,441,573  41,802 
Social assistance $338,965,518  $1,043,200,278  $342,829,725  14,145 
Performing arts, spectator sports, museums $250,067,096  $741,223,879  $257,444,075  8,927 
Amusements, gambling, and recreation  $335,187,919  $911,074,282  $265,435,313  9,816 
Accommodation $332,977,505  $907,929,763  $258,323,948  7,779 
Food services and drinking places $1,211,327,253  $3,697,091,909  $992,682,684  41,052 
Other services, except government $1,623,941,743  $4,977,543,838  $1,442,222,662  43,868 
Total $49,059,280,000  $136,071,240,365 $37,824,533,775  964,907 
Note: Initial reductions in GDP are assumed to be proportional to total economic output by industry.  
Source: Tax Foundation; U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis “Regional Input-Output Modeling System, 
2006 (Region: United States). 
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B. IMPACT ON EQUITY PRICES 
As noted in Section II of this study, cap and trade imposes potentially large transition 
costs on owners of capital in carbon-heavy fossil fuel industries as the quantity of their 
products demanded falls in response to price increases. Another way of viewing the 
impact of cap and trade is by exploring the likely impact on stock prices for these carbon-
intensive U.S. industries.  
 
The impact of cap-and-trade on stock prices is an important policy consideration for two 
reasons. First, because investors typically hold diversified portfolios of assets through 
mutual funds and other investment vehicles deterioration in equity prices for carbon-
intensive industries could affect retirement savings and household wealth a large number 
of U.S. households, labor unions, and private sector retirement funds. Second, to the 
extent that equity losses are concentrated in particular industries the impact on stock 
prices is a measure of the economic incentive these industries have to oppose climate 
policy through lobbying and the broader political process.  
 
Table 10 presents estimates of the impact of cap and trade on stock prices and after-tax 
profits for various U.S. industry sectors. The figures are drawn from a comprehensive 
2002 study from Resources for the Future using a computable general equilibrium model 
of the U.S. economy and a cap-and-trade system that reduces carbon emissions by 
roughly 23 percent. Although the assumed emissions reduction is larger than the 15 
percent reduction modeled in this study, the likely impact on equity prices is of a similar 
order of magnitude.  
 
TABLE 10. IMPACT OF A TYPICAL CAP-AND-TRADE SYSTEM ON EQUITY PRICES AND 
PROFITS (ASSUMES 23 PERCENT REDUCTION IN U.S. CARBON EMISSIONS) 
Industry 
Percentage Impact on 
Equity Prices 
Percentage Impact on 
After-Tax Profits 
Coal Mining -54.6% -40.0% 
Oil and Gas Extraction -20.0% -5.5% 
Electric Utilities -4.2% -6.2% 
Petroleum Refining -2.1% -9.1% 
Metals and Machinery -0.9% -3.5% 
Source: Goulder (2002). 
 
Overall, a U.S. cap-and-trade system could reduce equity prices by 54.6 percent for coal 
mining companies, 20 percent for oil and natural gas extraction companies, and 4.2 
percent for electric utilities. In terms of reduced after-tax profits, cap-and-trade could 
result in a 40 percent reduction in profits for coal mining companies, a 9.1 percent 
reduction for petroleum refiners, and a 6.2 percent reduction for the nation’s electric 
utilities. For U.S. shareholders, these stock-price declines represent a significant indirect 
cost of implementing a national cap-and-trade system.   
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V. METHODOLOGY AND DATA SOURCES 
 
The distributional and economic impact results in this study are based on standard input-
output models using the latest available data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
This section explains the methodology and data sources used.  
 
A. DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
The distributional estimates presented in Section III are based on a Leontief input-output 
model. Because this approach captures flows between industries, it can be used to model 
the way cap and trade burdens are pushed forward through the network of inter-industry 
transactions into the final prices of consumer goods. 
 
i. Theory of Input-Output 
The economist’s input-output framework is based on two relationships. First, the total 
value of each industry’s output equals the amount they spend on inputs plus any value 
they add in the production process. Second, each industry’s total output must equal the 
amount other industries buy from them as inputs plus the amount they sell as final output 
to consumers, governments and the rest of the world.23  
 
For industry one, we can write these two relationships as follows: 
 
(1) 111221111  ... VxpxpxpY nn +⋅++⋅+⋅=  
 
Where:  
 1Y  = Total value of output from industry one; 
=nppp ,...,, 21  Price of intermediate inputs purchased by industry one from other 
industries one through n;  
=nxxx 11211 ,...,,  Quantity of intermediate inputs purchased by industry one from 
other industries one through n; and 
 1V  = Value added by industry one. 
 
(2) 11112111111  ... DpxpxpxpY n ⋅+⋅++⋅+⋅=  
 
Where: 
1Y  = Total value of output from industry one; 
1p  = Price of output from industry one; 
=12111 ,...,, nxxx  Quantity of output from industry one purchased as intermediate 
inputs by other industries one through n; and 
                                                 
23 For earlier presentations of the input-output theory underlying distributional analysis of climate policy, 
see Fullerton (1995) and Metcalf (1999). 
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1D  = Quantity of industry one’s output sold as final demand to consumers, 
government and the rest of the world. 
 
These relationships can be summarized as a standard input-output table. In table (3) 
below, summing down the columns corresponds to equation (1) while summing across 
the rows corresponds to equation (2):  
 
(3)  
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Table (3) can be manipulated into a Leontief input-output model as follows. Reading 
down the first column of the table, the sum of inputs purchased by column industry one 
plus their value added is equal to total output for that industry. Put differently,  
 
(4)  1
1
11 VxpY
n
j
jj +⋅= ∑
=
 
 
To simplify the algebra we define a new number ija . Let ija  equal the share of each row 
industry j’s total quantity of output purchased from them as an intermediate input by each 
column industry i. That is, let: 
 
(5) 
j
ijj
ij Y
xp
a
⋅=  
 
This is known as the “input coefficient” between industries i and j, and will generally be 
a fraction between zero and one. If the value of row industry j’s total output represents a 
pie, ija  represents the slice purchased from them by column industry i as an input. For 
example, if 12a  = 0.2, column industry one buys 20 percent of row industry two’s output.  
 
Define a new matrix A that collects the ija  coefficients for all industries into an n x n 
matrix. To calculate A, we divide each ijj xp ⋅  entry in the input-output table (3) by its 
row sum. The result is the following: 
 
(6)  A = 
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We can now substitute ija  into equation (4) and rewrite it as follows: 
 
(7)  1
1
11 VYaY
n
j
jj +⋅= ∑
=
 
 
By dividing both sides of equation (7) by the quantity of column industry one’s total 
output 1x , we can convert this relationship into one between the price of industry one’s 
output—which is equal to the value of total output divided by the quantity of output—and 
its various inputs and value added. That is, 
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This equation only shows the relationship between inputs and output prices for column 
industry one. To generalize it for all n industries we can express equation (8) in matrix 
notation as follows: 
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In equation (9), the n x n matrix of a’s on the right-hand side is simply the transpose of 
the A matrix defined above. Label this A’. Also, by labeling the n x 1 price vector of 
( xY )’s as P, and the n x 1 value-added vector of ( xV )’s as V, we can rewrite equation 
(9) more simply as: 
 
(10)  VPAP +⋅= '  
 
Solving for the price vector P, we get:24 
 
        VPAP =⋅− '  
    VPAI =⋅− )'(  
(11)  VAIP ⋅−= −1)'(  
 
Equation (11) is the basic input-output model of the economy relating the price of 
industry economic output to the input coefficients and value added. This is a variant of 
the standard “Leontief” model named after economist Wassily Leontief.  
 
                                                 
24 In equation (11), I represents an n x n identity matrix with 1’s along the diagonal and zeros elsewhere. 
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The price vector P in equation (11) represents prices throughout the economy before cap 
and trade. Next we develop an alternative model that includes the impact of cap and 
trade. Comparing the price vectors in the two models provides the estimate of the impact 
of cap and trade on prices.  
 
In modeling cap and trade, we follow the standard assumption that industry burdens are 
forward-shifted in the form of higher prices.25 As with a federal carbon tax, cap-and-trade 
burdens are passed from carbon-emitting industries to the industries that purchase 
intermediate inputs from them. In turn, these burdens are ultimately passed forward to 
households in the form of higher prices for final products throughout the economy.  
 
Let jt  represent the total dollar value of carbon allowances that must be held by industry 
j as a percentage of that industry’s total intermediate output. That is, if industry one’s 
carbon emissions are 1,000 tons per year, allowance prices are $100 per ton and 
intermediate output for industry one is $500,000, 1t  will equal ($100,000)/($500,000) = 
0.20. This represents the cap-and-trade “tax” that will be passed forward from industry 
one to other industries and consumers.  
 
Since cap-and-trade burdens are forward shifted, the impact is equivalent to multiplying 
the intermediate inputs portion of equation (7) by )1( jt+ . Under a cap-and-trade system 
equation (7) then becomes: 
 
(12)  1
1
11 )1(ˆ VtYaY
n
j
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=
 
 
In equation (12) the value of industry output Y has been relabeled Yˆ  to denote that it 
includes the embedded cap-and-trade burden. To finish the model, define matrix T as an n 
x n matrix with (1 + industry effective cap-and-trade burden t) along the diagonal and 
zeros elsewhere: 
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25 Fullerton (1995) and Metcalf (1999) refer to this as the “Armington” assumption after Armington (1969). 
Specifically, it assumes U.S. products are sufficiently different from foreign substitutes to allow the 
demand curve for domestic products to be downward-sloping. Combined with the assumption that the long-
run supply of carbon-intensive products is perfectly elastic, the result is full forward-shifting of cap-and-
trade burdens; that is, )( dss ηηη −  = 1 where sη  and dη  are the price elasticities of supply and demand 
for carbon-intensive products, respectively. 
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Using the simplified notation from equation (10), we can rewrite equation (12) more 
generally for the impact of cap and trade for all n industries as the following:  
  
(14)  VPTAP +⋅⋅= ˆ'ˆ  
 
Solving for the price vector under cap and trade Pˆ , we get: 
 
    VPTAP =⋅⋅− ˆ'ˆ  
 VPTAI =⋅⋅− ˆ)'(  
(15)  VTAIP ⋅⋅−= −1)'(ˆ  
 
Equation (15) provides an input-output model that includes the burden of cap and trade 
on industry-level prices. The two price vectors from equations (11) and (15) can then be 
compared to isolate the impact of cap and trade on prices at the industry level:  
 
(11)  No Cap and Trade (Industry Level): VAIP ⋅−= −1)'(  
 
(15)  With Cap and Trade (Industry Level): VTAIP ⋅⋅−= −1)'(ˆ  
 
One complication is that is the price vectors in (11) and (15) are for industry-level prices. 
That is, they assume each of the n industries in the economy produces only one type of 
commodity. In reality industries may produce a variety of commodities making it 
necessary to convert industry-level price impacts into commodity-level price impacts.  
 
This can be accomplished through the use of a price-transformation matrix as follows. 
Let Z be an n x m matrix of n industries (corresponding to rows) and m commodities 
(corresponding to columns). Let each entry represent the fraction of column commodity i 
that is produced by row industry j, with each column summing to one. Commodity-level 
price impacts are then given by, 
 
(16)  No Cap and Trade (Commodity Level): VAIZPc ⋅−⋅= −1)'('  
 
(17)  With Cap and Trade (Commodity Level): VTAIZPc ⋅⋅−⋅= −1)'('ˆ  
 
ii. Data Sources 
The data for the input-output model are drawn from the 2002 benchmark input-output 
accounts from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), released in September 
2007.26 Starting with the rectangular Make and Use tables at the summary level, we 
combine them into a 133 x 133 square input-output (I-O) table as follows.  
 
                                                 
26 See U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, “2002 Standard Make and Use Tables at the summary level” 
available online at bea.gov/industry/io_benchmark.htm. 
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First we construct the intermediate-uses portion of the I-O table. Starting with the Make 
table, let M be a 133 x 134 matrix where each element is equal to the corresponding Make 
table element divided by the column total. In the Use table, remove the rows labeled 
“noncomparable imports” and “ROW adjustment” and label the 134 x 133 intermediate-
uses portion of the table U. Let S be a 133 x 133 matrix equal to M x U. This represents 
the intermediate-uses portion of the I-O table.  
 
Next we construct the final demands portion of the I-O table. Beginning with the Use 
table, we label the 133 x 13 final demands portion of the table D. Let K be a 133 x 13 
matrix equal to M x D. This represents the final demands portion of the I-O table. To 
complete the table we reconcile the sum of each industry’s column output to their row 
output using the “gross operating surplus” component of column-industry value added as 
a balancing item.27 This results in a 133 x 133 I-O table for the U.S. economy for 2002. 
 
The analysis in this study is based on emissions and consumer expenditure data for 
calendar year 2006. The 2002 I-O table is therefore inflated to 2006 based on the growth 
rate of nominal U.S. GDP between 2002 and 2006. This 2006 table serves as the basis for 
the input-output model outlined above.  
 
The Z price-transformation matrix is constructed as follows. We begin with the 2002 
benchmark Make table at the summary level. The table is reported in producer’s prices 
paid by firms rather than purchaser’s prices faced by household consumers. To adjust the 
table to purchaser’s prices, we use data from the BEA’s 2002 bridge tables to Personal 
Consumption Expenditures (PCE) to add each commodity’s transportation costs and 
retail and wholesale margins to the table. Using this Make table in purchaser’s prices we 
then create the 133 x 134 Z matrix by dividing each element in the Make table by its 
column sum.  
 
Once the P vector of commodity-level price impacts is estimated, the percentage price 
changes are weighted by each commodity’s total output from the Make table. The 
aggregate cap-and-trade burden is then distributed to the 134 I-O commodities based on 
this weighted distribution. Once burdens have been distributed to commodities we use the 
BEA’s 2002 bridge tables to distribute burdens to the 230 PCE categories in the National 
Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). Once burdens are distributed to PCE categories 
we construct a final crosswalk from PCE categories to the 98 household expenditure 
categories in the 2006 Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) from the U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics.28 Using public use data from the CEX we distribute cap-and-trade 
burdens to households by income quintiles, income groups, age groups, U.S. regions, and 
type of household.  
                                                 
27 A complete 2002 U.S. input-output table is available from the author upon request.  
28 A crosswalk from PCE categories to CEX categories is available from the author upon request.  
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B. ECONOMIC IMPACT ANALYSIS  
The economic impact estimates presented in Section IV are based on 2006 RIMS II 
multipliers from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. The multipliers are “Type II” 
multipliers that account for the impact of both industry and household purchases. Once 
the CBO estimate of a 0.34 percent reduction in GDP is distributed to industries these 
initial changes in GDP by industry are multiplied by the final-demand multipliers for 
employment, household earnings, and total economic output for each industry.  
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